I test theories of the recent financial crisis by studying how banks' pre-crisis investments connect to their CEOs' beliefs. Using different proxies for beliefs, I find banks with larger housing investments and worse crisis performance had CEOs who were more optimistic ex ante. Banks with the most optimistic CEOs experienced 20 percentage points higher real estate loan growth, and 15 percentage points lower crisis period stock returns. Bank decisions appear consistent with CEO beliefs.
Introduction
The real estate investments of US banks played a central role in the recent financial crisis. They were a major cause of severe bank losses that led to financial panics, largescale contractions in lending, and disruptions in real economic activities (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Greenstone and Mas, 2012) . Why did banks build up so much risk exposure to real estate? There are two prominent views on this question. One view highlights agency problems: bank managers and employees had incentive structures which focused on short-term performance and encouraged excessive risk taking (Acharya, Philippon, Richardson, and Roubini, 2009; Dowd, 2009) . Another view emphasizes bounded rationality: bank decision-makers extrapolated on past trends of house prices and underestimated the probability of price declines (Barberis, 2013; Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2012; Cheng, Raina, and Xiong, 2014) .
In this paper, I test alternative theories of the crisis by studying bank CEOs' pre-crisis beliefs, and importantly, how CEOs' beliefs connect to their banks' investments in the housing boom and ultimately to bank performance during the crisis. The key observation is that the above two classes of theories have different predictions about whether a bank's investment decision would be consistent with its manager's personal view of bank prospects. If real estate investments were driven by managerial beliefs, then we would expect to see a positive correlation between the aggressiveness of investments and the CEO's optimism about their future payoffs. However, if investments were instead driven by agency problems or other frictions, then CEOs at banks with more investments do not need to appear more optimistic. In the case where managers were aware of the impending collapse in the housing market, CEOs at banks with more real estate investments should even exhibit greater pessimism in their private beliefs about their banks' prospects. Therefore, the relationship between managers' beliefs and bank decisions may shed further light on the factors contributing to the financial crisis.
In this analysis, the belief that I focus on is the CEO's view of future returns to his own bank's real estate exposures. For simplicity, I refer to this belief as "CEO Optimism". To measure such beliefs, I take a revealed-belief approach and construct proxies using CEOs' holding decisions with respect to their own banks' equity.
1 The primary measure I use is based on the log change in CEOs' total holdings of their banks' stocks and delta-weighted options in the boom years of 2002 through 2005. 2 Additionally, I check the robustness of the results using an alternative measure based on whether CEOs choose to exercise vested deeply-in-the-money options, following Tate (2005, 2008) . Essentially, equity-based measures capture CEOs' beliefs about future returns of their banks' stocks.
Because a major part of commercial banks' assets are real estate related, 3 and bank stock returns in the past two decades have been significantly influenced by the large swing in housing prices, beliefs about returns to real estate assets and returns to bank stocks should be highly correlated in this period.
Using both proxies for beliefs, I find that CEO optimism is positively correlated with the increase of real estate loans in bank assets during the boom, and negatively correlated The consistency between bank decisions and managerial beliefs appears less supportive of the view that bank executives made housing investments due to misaligned incentives, despite their awareness of impending problems. If this view were true, managers at banks with the most real estate investments should be most active in selling their equities to cash out in the pre-crisis period, which is the opposite of what I find in the data.
The main results are well-exemplified by a comparison of US Bancorp and SunTrust
Bank, the 9th and 10th largest US banks in early 2000s. These two banks offered similar services, but were quite different in their CEOs' judgment during the housing boom.
While SunTrust's pre-crisis CEO Phillip Humann explicitly expressed optimistic views, US Bancorp's CEO Jerry Grundhofer was more cautious, telling shareholders that the company was taking steps to reduce risks. Humann increased his personal equity holding about their firms' prospects. Second, equity generally has low transaction costs and is liquid enough to allow for frequent adjustments. Third, equity-based measures are easy to construct using publicly available data on insider equity transactions. 2 The selection of the boom period follows Mian and Sufi (2009) Additionally, I address the concern that housing market dynamics in a bank's geographic area could affect both the bank's real estate loan growth and the CEO's equity holding change (through equity compensation coupled with disposition restrictions). In the data, measured optimism is not significantly correlated with local house price appreciation. The results are also robust to taking out county fixed effects using detailed loan-level data. Lastly, I perform the analysis for CEOs on CFOs and COOs; I find weak results using the measured optimism of COOs, and no results using that of CFOs. Since all top executives are generally subject to the same set of firm policies, these tests further alleviate concerns about bank-level unobservables.
In the aftermath of the crisis, there is a vibrant literature exploring the causes of financial institutions' risk exposures (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Minton, Taillard, and Williamson, 2014) .
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by documenting the link between managerial beliefs and bank actions. Indeed, while policy-makers on the front line of crisis resolution have noted that beliefs of financial institutions are central to understanding the housing boom and the crisis (e.g. Geithner (2014)), empirical research on this issue is relatively sparse, especially compared to the extensive literature on agency problems and moral hazard in the banking sector. In a pioneering paper, Cheng et al. (2014) study personal housing transactions records of mid-level Wall Street securitization managers, and point out that this group of financial industry insiders appear to have held distorted beliefs about the housing market in the boom. My paper complements their work. My findings highlight that bank decision-makers' beliefs are closely connected with banks' investment decisions and the associated losses. In addition, while Cheng et al. (2014) study financial intermediaries as one group, I also look more closely at the substantial cross-sectional differences among banks in their investments and crisis performance, and how this heterogeneity relates to differences in bank executives' beliefs.
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6 To closely connect personal views and institutional decisions, I focus on CEOs rather than mid-level managers since CEOs' opinions are more likely to be relevant for firm policies (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005) , and the beliefs and incentives of lower level employees are possibly influenced by the views and actions of top executives (Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp, 2013;  Several recent papers study the housing boom and the financial crisis from other angles, and find evidence that hints at the role of over-optimism. For instance, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) investigate bank CEOs' incentive structure, and show that the degree of incentive alignment cannot explain bank performance in the financial crisis. Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2015a) , Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2015b) and Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2012) study patterns in loan origination and mortgage delinquency, and argue the facts are most consistent with a narrative of the credit boom that emphasizes distorted beliefs. These findings may not be conclusive, and many have sparked lively
debates. Yet it is evident from these debates the value to understand beliefs and how they relate to bank actions.
Finally, my paper contributes to research on beliefs, corporate investment, and macroeconomic outcomes (Eisner, 1978; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner, 2006; Greenwood and Hanson, 2015; Kozlowski, Veldkamp, Stern, and Venkateswaran, 2015) . In recent work, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2015) show that executives' expectations are the primary determinant of firm investment, and that these expectations exhibit systematic biases. This general insight can be particularly important in the context of the banking sector, given that banks' decisions determine the availability of credit in the economy, and credit is well known to be a key driver of fluctuations and crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor, 2015) .
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the sample of banks and the data; Section 3 explains the optimism measures; Section 4 presents the main results and robustness checks; Section 5 discusses the illustrative case and examines CEO optimism among the largest banks; Section 6 concludes.
Data
I collect three types of data on banks: 1) data on executive equity holdings and transactions to construct proxies for executive beliefs, 2) bank balance sheet and loan originations data to evaluate pre-crisis investment decisions, and 3) data on bank stocks to measure crisis performance and control for other stock characteristics.
The initial sample of banks includes publicly listed bank holding companies, commer- Benabou, 2013; Caillaud and Tirole, 2007) .
cial banks, and firms with SIC codes from 6200 to 6299. Then I review firm descriptions on Reuters and exclude 1) banks whose major markets are outside of the US, 2) banks that do not have exposures to the real estate market, such as banks that specialize in student loans and auto loans, 3) asset management firms, and 4) other institutions excluded in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) . Because investment banks, brokers, and dealers may not be directly comparable to commercial banks, I also exclude them in the main sample.
7 The supplementary appendix reports the list of firms excluded from the initial sample of banks, as well as the remaining sample after the drops. Results are similar if they are included. Since the largest investment banks played an important role in the crisis, I also discuss them individually along with the largest commercial banks in Section 5.2.
8 Before 2006, Thomson Reuters' Insiders Database is the only publicly available source (to my knowledge) that provides information on option expiration dates and exercise prices, which are needed to calculate option deltas. The data is based on SEC forms 3, 4, and 5, which all corporate insiders are required to file for their equity transactions and holdings. Starting in 2006, companies are also required to report the expiration dates and exercise prices of options currently held by executives in their annual proxy statements. The proxy statement data are recorded by Execucomp. To cross check the accuracy of my optimism measures constructed using Thomson Reuters data, I also compute the measures using Execucomp data from 2006 onwards. The measures computed using these two sources are very highly correlated.
9 The list of included banks in the supplementary appendix also shows which institutions are bank holding companies. 
Measures of Executive Optimism

General Framework
This section discusses proxies of CEO optimism. I construct two measures from CEOs' holding decisions with respect to their own banks' equity. The primary measure is the change in total holdings of bank stocks and delta-weighted options. The alternative measure, following Tate (2005, 2008) , is based on decisions to exercise vested, deeply-in-the-money options. In essence, both measures reflect CEOs' attitude towards equity accumulation, and therefore their beliefs about future returns to their banks' stocks. To the extent that a substantial portion of US commercial banks' assets are real estate related and these assets have been a main driver of bank performance due to the large swing in house prices, beliefs about future stock returns should be highly correlated with beliefs about the future performance of real estate related assets.
To further illustrate the connection between equity-based optimism measures and bank real estate investments, consider the following three cases. In the first case, suppose that real estate investments are related to CEO optimism. When a CEO becomes more optimistic about returns to real estate related assets, he will want to make more real estate investments to increase expected firm profits (and the value of his existing equity holdings). As expected firm value increases according to his beliefs, the CEO will also be willing to hold more firm equity. Thus, we would expect to see a generally positive correlation between the CEO's willingness to hold bank equity and the bank's real estate investments.
In the second case, suppose that real estate investments are driven by other factors such as the CEO's short-term incentives from making these investments, 10 but the CEO is aware of a possible future collapse and is therefore pessimistic about their long-term returns. In this situation, the bank's real estate investments will increase with the shortterm incentives. However, as the CEO is pessimistic about their longer-term prospects, the more investments the bank makes, the more he will want to reduce his personal exposure to bank equity. Accordingly, we would expect to see a generally negative correlation between the CEO's willingness to hold bank equity and the bank's real estate investments.
In the third case, suppose there are short-term incentives for real estate investments and the CEO is also sufficiently optimistic. Like in the previous case, the short-term incentives will lead to an increase in investments. As investments expand, an optimistic CEO may also think that the expected value of firm assets has become higher, and his desired equity holding may increase. In this situation, the CEO's short-term gains from housing investments could amplify the influence of optimism, and both incentives and optimism would contribute to over-investments. Thus, a positive relationship between measured optimism and real estate investments does not necessarily rule out short-term incentives coexisting with optimism. Nonetheless, it would be inconsistent with the second case where the CEO is aware of the danger yet invests due to misaligned incentives.
Taken together, if real estate investments are related to CEO optimism, we would expect to see a positive correlation between investment growth and the CEO's measured optimism. However, if agency frictions play a dominant role while the CEO anticipates the downside, we would expect to see a negative correlation between investment growth and the CEO's measured optimism. One caveat is that while a positive correlation suggests the role of CEO optimism and goes against the hypothesis of CEO awareness, it does not necessarily rule out the possibility that short-term incentives might coexist with over-optimism and even amplify the effect of optimism.
The Equity Holding Measure
My first measure of executive optimism is the log change of total equity holding from 2002 to 2005. Total equity holding consists of stocks and delta-weighted options.
11 For each year, I calculate total holding by month end for each executive and take the median month-end holding in that year to be the annual holding measure. I do this instead of using the year-end holding to avoid the possibility that an executive may have a large holding at a particular time because he just received an equity award but has not had the time to adjust positions to a desired level. There are some outliers, potentially due to reporting errors, and I winsorize the largest and smallest 5% holding change observations.
The first ten columns of Table 2 In Table 1 have similar size, market capitalization, real estate loan to total asset ratio, and dividend yield ratio. Growth of real estate loans and stock returns during the boom increase by quintile, and stock returns during the financial crisis decrease by quintile.
In practice there might be other factors that influence executives' equity holdings (such as firm policies, risk aversion, outside wealth, etc.), some of which may not be observable. I will address this issue in depth in the empirical analysis of Section 4. In addition, I construct another optimism measure for robustness checks.
The Option Exercise Measure
My second proxy for beliefs, following Malmendier and Tate (2005) , is based on whether the CEO exercises vested options that are enough in-the-money. The theoretical framework is provided by Hall and Murphy (2002) . Since CEOs generally have large equity positions in their firms, under-diversification and risk aversion make it optimal for a rational CEO to exercise options that are enough in-the-money immediately after vesting (Hall and Murphy, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005) . Here, as in Malmendier and Tate (2005) , I take the in-the-money threshold to be 67%; results are similar for thresholds from 50% to more than 90%.
For each year, I look at all the vested options held by the CEO. I construct a binary variable "Opt" which takes value 1 in a certain year if the CEO does not exercise any of his vested options that are more than 67% in-the-money in that year; it takes value 0 if the CEO exercises at least some vested options that are more than 67% in-the-money; it is set to missing if the CEO does not have any vested options that are more than 67%
in-the-money in that year. I exclude any options that expire in the current year.
It is important to note the difference between my approach and the original Malmendier and Tate measure. The goal of Malmendier and Tate is to capture the "permanent" and "habitual" trait of overconfidence, whereas I would like to measure the degree of optimism at a given point in time (and the level of optimism may fluctuate over time). Accordingly, I categorize CEOs as "optimistic" on an annual basis, while the Malmendier-Tate overconfidence dummy is constructed by looking at the entire history of option exercises to find persistent late exercise behavior. In addition, the annual proxy I use also makes it easier to control for exercise behavior in other time periods, which helps to make sure that the results are not driven by "rules-of-thumb" or by bank policies. Table 3 Panel A summarizes the total number of CEOs with at least 67% in-themoney vested options and the number of them exercising such options. In a typical year, the fraction of CEOs not exercising these options is quite high, similar to what is found in Malmendier and Tate (2005) . As discussed in Malmendier and Tate (2005) , this measure is not a conservative one. In addition, this binary variable will not be able to capture the full range of optimism. Therefore, I use it to roughly differentiate the relative level of optimism among CEOs, which serves as robustness checks.
There could be concerns that CEOs' option exercises are influenced by certain firm policies. To see whether this possibility poses serious problems, I check the cross-year correlation of option exercise measure in Table 3 Panel B. The correlations are moderate, similar to the case of the equity holding measure, which may alleviate some concerns. I will address this issue in more detail in the empirical analysis.
Main Results
CEO Optimism and Pre-Crisis Real Estate Investments
A. Background
In this section, I analyze how CEO optimism relates to bank real estate investments during the housing boom. I begin with the growth of real estate loans in bank assets.
Real estate loans are informative for at least two reasons. First, real estate loans had become the largest component of commercial banks' assets by the 2000s, accounting for about 50% of assets for the median bank. This amount is substantial compared to the share of securities (20% for the median bank and 25% for all commercial bank assets), or the share of commercial and consumer loans combined (14% for the median bank and 20% for all commercial bank assets). Thus, banks' decision about real estate exposure through the loan portfolio is important, and it is likely to be closely related to CEOs' beliefs.
Second, ex post evidence suggests that bank performance during the crisis was significantly negatively correlated with pre-crisis housing loan growth, and charge-offs on real estate loans were a major part of banks' losses. For banks in my sample, the median net charge-off on real estate loans over 2008 and 2009 was 0.83% of assets (the mean was 1.34%), which is quite large compared to banks' 1% ROA in normal years. Thus, exposure to the housing market through real estate loans is also highly relevant to the crisis. Nonetheless, there may be other aspects to banks' real estate exposure and vulnerability, and the total loss could result from a combination of factors (such as liquidity, capital structure, borrower compositions etc.). Therefore, in Section 4.2 I also use bank stock returns during the financial crisis as a more holistic ex post proxy for overall risk exposure.
Many narratives of the crisis also emphasize the role of credit derivatives (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford, 2009; Gorton, 2010) . However, this test is difficult to implement because credit derivatives are concentrated in a small number of large banks. As of 2005, no more than 25 US banks held credit derivatives (Minton, Stulz, and Williamson, 2005) .
This small number does not allow for systematic cross-sectional analysis. Nonetheless, one might be able to get some sense about how optimism relates to investments in credit derivatives in the discussion of the largest banks in Section 5.2.
B. Basic Results
In Table 4 column (1) One concern about these baseline regressions is that certain unobservable factors could affect both the CEO's equity holding and the growth rate of real estate loans. For example, banks that specialize in riskier business or those that are eager to expand might use more equity compensation (Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman, 2015) , discourage equity disposition through explicit and implicit company rules, or hire CEOs who are less risk averse, which could result in faster accumulation of CEO equity holdings. Meanwhile, these banks might also be more likely to make large real estate investments during the housing boom.
To address this concern, in column (3) I control for the CEO's equity holding change in the previous three years, as well as the historical growth rate of real estate loans. The raw correlation between the equity holding change from 2002 to 2005 and that from 1998 to 2001 is 0.05, with a p-value of 0.6. This suggests that CEOs' equity holding changes are not necessarily persistent, which alleviates some concerns of firm policies driving observed holding changes. Column (4) reports the regression with all the aforementioned controls.
These controls do not have much impact on the coefficient of the equity holding measure.
C. Influence of Local Housing Market Dynamics
Another concern about the baseline regressions may come from heterogeneity in banks' geographical areas. One might worry that for banks in roaring housing markets, real estate loan growth is likely to be higher because of higher demand or larger loan size (resulting from higher prices). At the same time, these banks may also become more profitable, which then translates into more CEO compensation. If CEOs are not able to fully adjust their equity holdings, they could experience faster equity accumulation and be mislabeled as "optimistic".
To examine this concern, I first construct an estimate of house price changes in each "FHFA Index Change"), which will be a proxy for local housing market dynamics.
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In Figure 2 I plot the relationship between the CEO's equity holding change and the average change of house prices in the bank's geographic markets. It shows that there is no obvious correlation between the local house price dynamics and the measured CEO optimism, which mitigates concerns about house prices affecting measured optimism.
In column (5) of Table 4 I add "FHFA Index Change" as a control variable and the results remain. In the supplementary appendix, I also divide the CEOs into the "more optimistic" group (equity holding change above median) and the "less optimistic" group (equity holding change below median), and calculate a matching estimate with "FHFA Index Change" as well as other bank characteristics as matching covariates. The matching results show that the growth rates of real estate loans during the housing boom are 12 The FHFA also provides a housing price index at the MSA level, but the MSA coverage is very limited, so it is difficult to use the MSA level indices here.
13 Instead of using the share of total originated HMDA mortgages, I can also use the share of total originated and held on balance sheet mortgages. This does not change the results. I weigh by the share as of 2002 to avoid complications from banks potentially shifting their businesses according to local housing market dynamics, which could be correlated with CEO beliefs. However, using the share from the current year does not change the results either.
significantly different for these two subsamples.
The analysis above measures house price changes only at the state level, due to limited data coverage for house prices at lower levels. One might still worry about heterogeneity within a state. To control for local housing market dynamics and loan demand shocks at a finer level, I perform the following test using the HMDA dataset, which documents loan-level information that allows me to track loan originations by banks at the county level.
14 First, using the HMDA data, I compute total loans originated and held on balance sheet by each bank in each county from 2002 to 2005, and that from 1998 to 2001. 15 Then I take the log difference of these two amounts: ∆ ij = log(loan0205 ij ) − log(loan9801 ij ).
Next I perform a decomposition similar to Greenstone and Mas (2012) :
where b i is a full set of bank fixed effects, and c j is a full set of county fixed effects which absorbs changes in local conditions. With this decomposition, the bank fixed effects b i
should capture the expansion of housing loans by each bank beyond the influence of local conditions. Lastly I use the bank fixed effects b i as the dependent variable in the regressions in Table 5 . Columns (1) and (2) show that the b i calculated from originatedand-held HMDA loans is significantly positively correlated with CEO optimism.
D. Influence of Pre-Crisis Equity Compensation
Many concerns discussed above are related to the influence of executive compensation on the equity holding measure. To address this important issue most directly, in 15 Here I use originated-and-held loans because they contribute to banks' direct real estate exposure through their assets. In Part E of this section I also discuss loans originated and sold for securitization.
From Table 6 columns (1) and (2), we can see that the counterfactual variable by itself does not seem to correlate with the growth of real estate loans. Columns (3) and (4) show that this variable does not account for the explanatory power of the actual change in equity holdings.
16 This "No Action" control is also used in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 , which tease out the impact of local conditions on loan growth at the county level (as explained above), and the results are the same.
E. Additional Results
Part C of this section uses HMDA data on loan originations to control for local housing market shocks in banks' business areas. A nice feature of the HMDA dataset is that it reports whether the loans are sold for securitization as opposed to held on bank balance
sheets. This allows me to also examine how CEO optimism affects banks' involvement in securitization. This exercise can shed some light on whether managerial beliefs are related to profits from the securitization business, as opposed to profits directly from real estate loans. In the supplementary appendix, I perform the same tests as those in Table 5 , with the bank fixed effect b i calculated based on originated-and-sold loans rather than originated-and-held loans. The growth of loans sold for securitizaion is also positively correlated with CEO optimism, but the relationship is not significant. This result suggests that while banks with more optimistic CEOs generally increase real estate exposures in their own assets, they are not necessarily more aggressive in selling off loans for securtization.
Finally, there are several alternative specifications of the main tests which are presented in the supplementary appendix. First, I add outstanding credit commitments for loans backed by real estate. These are credit lines that can be drawn down at previously agreed rates by real estate loan borrowers, and they could be another source of exposure to real estate-related risks. 17 Results including loan commitments are not much different.
Second, I use the log change in the share of real estate loans in total asset instead of the log change of the amount of real estate loans. If the CEOs' optimism is primarily about the housing market, then we would expect to see real estate loans "crowd out"
other assets. In the data, there is indeed a significant correlation between the change 16 Indeed, note that the actual holding change can be broken into two components: the passive change, which is measured by the "No Action" variable, and the active change. After controlling for the "No Action" variable, the coefficient on the realized holding growth is the same as the coefficient on the active change.
17 The median ratio of real estate loan commitments over total assets is about 6%. Column (1) of Table 7 reports the baseline regression result. It shows that a larger increase in the CEO's pre-crisis equity holding is associated with worse ex post stock performance. A 1% higher increase in equity holding corresponds to 0.21% lower returns on average. The dashed line in Figure 1 plots the average crisis period return by equity holding change quintiles, which shows a similar negative relationship. The average return for the largest equity holding quintiles is about 15 percentage points lower than that for the smallest quintiles.
Similar to the analysis in the previous section, in column (2) I control for dividend yield and volatility, which could affect equity holding decisions; I also add the beta of the bank stock, which could affect stock returns. In column (3), I add bank size and the share of real estate loans in asset prior to 2002. In column (4), I also use the CEO's equity holding change in the three years before 2002 to control for firm-level and individual-level unobservables, as well as real estate loan growth in the three previous years to control for the bank's general tendency of real estate loan expansion. Column (5) includes all the aforementioned controls. In all specifications, the coefficient on the equity holding measure is large and negative.
Overall, the findings above suggest that worse-performing banks appear to be associated with CEOs who were relatively more optimistic during the height of the housing boom. In the next section, I perform further tests using the alternative optimism measure.
Results Using the Option Exercise Measure of Executive Optimism
In this section, I use the alternative measure to check the robustness of the previous results. As described in Section 3.3, this measure (variable "Opt") is based on the executive's decision to keep or exercise options that are deeply in-the-money. Because this measure derives from option exercises, it should be less affected by equity compensation.
If anything, CEOs who have more equity compensation should have stronger incentives to exercise their in-the-money options, in which case they will be classified as "nonoptimistic" by the option exercise measure.
I start by verifying the relationship between CEO optimism and the growth of housing loans. Table 8 reports I then verify the results on CEO optimism and crisis performance using the option exercise measure. Table 9 Panel A presents the baseline regressions. Table 4 and Table 7 on CFOs and COOs. The measured optimism of the CFO is not significantly correlated with either the pre-crisis growth of real estate loans or the bank's performance during the crisis. There is a modest relationship between the measured optimism of the COO and those two variables.
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Since the measured optimism for CEOs, CFOs and COOs are not always significantly correlated, it further alleviates concerns that equity holding changes are driven by firm policies as opposed to individual choices. It is also interesting that COOs behave more like CEOs than CFOs do, and COOs' optimism seems more relevant. This is plausible given that COOs are generally involved in decisions on firm strategies and personnel, whereas
CFOs might focus more on technical financial and accounting issues. 
CEO Optimism among the Largest Banks
Given their size and systemic importance, investment decisions and performance of the largest banks are particularly relevant to financial stability. In this section I study the largest banks and examine the beliefs of their CEOs individually. Table 10 These patterns are generally consistent with biographical narratives of these CEOs' personalities and pre-crisis judgment. For example, Alan Greenberg, ex-Chairman and CEO of Bear Stearns who was also a mentor of Jimmy Cayne, wrote:
[W]hen I referred to the firm's ruling triumvirate I had a nickname for each:
Ego, Smarts and Smoothie. Ego obviously was Jimmy, a self-important tough talker whose listening skills diminished in inverse proportion to our stock price and the number of shares he owned... [T]he run-up in real estate prices wasn't originally perceived as a bubble. And when such apprehensions did begin to surface, they were neutralized by a chronic wishful optimism, an outlook colored by the tremendous success of our fixed-income divisions... Jimmy's megalomania was expressed most blatantly in his approach to the company stock. As far as I know, he never sold anything. The shares he held the day JPMorgan bought us consisted mainly of a career's worth of accumulated deferred compensation (Greenberg, 2010) .
The patterns in Table 10 are also consistent with the results in Section 4. CEOs at the worse-performing banks generally had larger ex ante increases in equity holdings, while
CEOs at the better-performing banks had smaller increases. It provides evidence that CEOs' ex ante optimism influenced bank investments, and contributed to losses during the financial crisis. The consistency between bank behavior and managerial beliefs is less supportive of the view that housing investments resulted from agency frictions while bank executives were systematically aware of the impending collapse.
These findings underscore the role of beliefs in the buildup to the recent financial crisis.
They complement the theoretical work of Simsek (2013) which emphasizes how lenders' beliefs can be central to credit booms. This points to the importance of understanding 23 The only exception is perhaps Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers. Although Richard Fuld still held a substantial amount of Lehman stocks by the time the firm declared bankruptcy, he did not seem to display significant optimism through his own equity holding decisions. While this discussion helps provide more concrete information about the CEOs at the most systematically important banks, one should be careful not to read too much into any single data point.
the formation and evolution of managerial beliefs at financial institutions, especially in extraordinary times like the years before the crisis. In particular, it is an open question why some CEOs appear to have had better judgment during the housing boom (or other similar episodes)-whether it is due to personality traits, past experiences, luck, or some corporate mechanisms that encouraged risk monitoring. Future research that sheds light on these questions may help inform policies aimed at enhancing financial stability. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 9 : Alternative Measure of CEO Optimism and Stock Performance during the Financial Crisis
A Figures
Cross-sectional regressions of holding period returns of bank stocks from January 2007 to December 2009 (dependent variable) on the option exercise measure of CEO optimism and other controls. "Opt2006", for example, is the value of the option exercise measure in 2006. Controls include dividend yield, bank stock volatility, bank stock beta and bank size (log assets), which are defined in the same way as in Table 7 .
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(8) This table presents the equity holdings of CEOs of the largest commercial and investment banks. Since Thomson Reuters does not maintain data for delisted firms, numbers presented here are taken directly from the firms' proxy filings. Before 2006, firms did not disclose information on the properties (exercise price and expiration date) of the options in the proxy filings, so the options are not delta-weighted, and include both exercisable and unexercisable options. For this reason, I do not add up stocks and options to compute total equity holdings. All numbers are as of the beginning of the specified year. 
